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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Determining "Reasonable Charges": A Teaching
Hospital Takes on the Federal Government Over
Recalculated Graduate Medical Education Expenses
by William L. Andreen
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 132-135. © 1997 American Bar Association.
Teaching hospitals in the United
States are reimbursed by the
Government for the services they
provide to Medicare patients, the
elderly and disabled, through their
training programs for resident doc-
tors. Reimbursement for graduate
medical education ("GME") costs is
based on a formula that is heavily
dependent on 1984 cost figures.
The formula takes the average cost
incurred in 1984 on a per-resident
basis, adjusts the number for
inflation, and multiplies it by the
total number of residents in the
current year.
By the late 1980s, the Medicare pro-
gram became concerned that a large
number of errors had been made in
the cost figures used to calculate
GME reimbursements for 1984.
Unless reaudited and corrected,
those mistakes would lead to over-
payments for many years to come.
Responding to this problem, the
Secretary of Health and Human
Services (the "Secretary") promul-
gated a rule in 1989 (the "reaudit
rule"), 42 C.F.R. § 413.86 (1996),
that required a reaudit of all the
1984 reimbursement determinations.
St. Paul-Ramsey Medical Center
(the "Medical Center" or the
"Center") claims that the Secretary
cannot re-examine its 1984 determi-
nations because they are final and
no longer subject to being reopened.
See 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1807(b),
405.1885(a), (b), and (d) (a reim-
bursement determination is final
and not subject to reaudit after
three years unless fraud contributed
to the determination). Accordingly,
the Center maintains that the
reaudit rule is invalid.
The Secretary, on the other hand,
claims that the reaudit rule is not
intended to recoup overpayments
for years in which there is a final
reimbursement decision. The reau-
dit rule, therefore, is a reasonably
crafted effort to prevent future
overpayments and to recoup
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FROM: THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
ISSUE
Is the Secretary's reaudit rule a
reasonable interpretation of
Congress' mandate to reimburse
only the "average amount [of GME
costs] recognized as reasonable"?
FACTS
Congress in 1965 created Medicare,
a federally funded program provid-
ing health insurance for older and
disabled Americans. Under Part A,
the Secretary reimburses hospitals
for certain covered services. Among
the allowable costs for which a
hospital may be reimbursed are
the costs of training programs for
healthcare professionals, including
GME programs.
At the end of each fiscal year, a
hospital seeking Medicare reim-
bursement must file a cost report
with a "fiscal intermediary," gener-
ally an insurance company designat-
ed by the Secretary. The report -
setting forth the hospital's costs
related to Medicare services - is
reviewed and, if necessary, audited
by the fiscal intermediary that then
makes a determination of the hospi-
tal's Medicare payment. These
determinations may be reopened, as
noted, during a three-year period in
order to re-examine the findings of
the intermediary.
Until 1985, GME costs were reim-
bursed on a reasonable-cost basis,
which included, for example, resi-
dent stipends and teaching-physi-
cian compensation attributable to
the education of residents. In 1986,
however, Congress amended
Medicare to change the way in
which reimbursable GME costs are
to be calculated. Under the changes,
GME costs would no longer be sub-
ject to detailed cost accounting on
an annual basis; instead, future
annual reimbursements would be
based on the costs allowed for the
1984 fiscal year, the baseline year.
More specifically, Congress directed
the Secretary to determine an
"average amount recognized as
reasonable" for each resident in
the baseline year of 1984. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ww(h)(2)(A) (1994). All
reimbursements for GME costs,
beginning with Medicare cost
reports filed by hospitals after July
1, 1985, would be calculated by
multiplying the hospital's average
cost per resident from the baseline
year, adjusted for inflation, by the
number of full-time-equivalent
residents for the year in question.
In late 1988, the Secretary proposed
the reaudit rule to implement
Congress' new GME reimbursement
p scheme. The rule as proposed would
authorize fiscal intermediaries to re-
examine 1984 baseline costs
and to reaudit those costs if they
appeared to be unreasonably high or
appeared to include misclassified or
nonallowable costs. Reauditing was
thought necessary to prevent
perpetuation of past mistakes.
The final reaudit rule, promulgated
in late 1989, retained this general
approach. Fiscal intermediaries
were required to reaudit teaching
hospitals to determine average per-
resident cost. In making this recal-
culation, the intermediaries were to
exclude any nonallowable or mis-
classified costs even if such costs
had previously been allowed.
The reaudit rule recognized, howev-
er, that prior cost determinations
might not be subject to reopening
under the Secretary's three-year
rule of repose. In those cases, the
reaudit rule provided that any
modification in 1984 GME costs
would affect only the computation
of average per-resident costs to be
used in the future and in any period
subject to reopening under the
three-year rule.
The Medical Center originally
received $9.9 million for its 1984
GME expenses. After reauditing in
late 1990 and early 1991, the fiscal
intermediary concluded that the
total allowable GME costs for 1984
were $5.5 million (later raised to
$5.9 million). No recoupment was
sought for that particular overpay-
ment because the three-year
reopening period for 1984 had
already run. However, the new
average per-resident amount of
$49,805.29 would be used to deter-
mine total GME reimbursement for
future years as well as in years still
subject to reopening.
The Center filed suit in federal dis-
trict court challenging the validity
of the reaudit rule. The district
court, in an unpublished opinion,
upheld the regulation and was
affirmed by the Eighth Circuit.
91 F.3d 57 (8th Cir. 1996). Both
courts concluded that the
Secretary's reaudit rule was a
reasonable interpretation of an
ambiguous congressional mandate.
That reasoning is now before the
Supreme Court, which granted the
Medical Center's petition for a
writ of certiorari. 117 S. Ct. 2406
(1997).
CASE ANALYSIS
The Medical Center contends that
the reaudit rule violates the plain
meaning of the 1986 amendment
that changed the way in which GME
costs are calculated. The amend-
ment provides that "the Secretary
shall determine, for the hospital's
cost reporting period that began
during fiscal year 1984, the average
amount recognized as reasonable
under this subchapter for direct
graduate medical education costs of
the hospital for each full-time-equiv-
alent resident." 42 U.S.C. §
1395ww(h)(2)(A).
(Continued on Page 134)
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The Center maintains that the
words "amount recognized as rea-
sonable" direct the Secretary to use
only the amount originally recog-
nized and paid as reasonable by the
fiscal intermediary for the baseline
year 1984 - $9.9 million in this
case. Here the Center stresses that
under the Secretary's own regula-
tions, its original GME reimburse-
ment for 1984 is final and binding
because the three-year reopening
period has long since passed.
The Center argues that since
Congress is presumed to know the
law in an area when it legislates, the
language "amount recognized as
reasonable" can mean only the
amount established as reasonable in
the normal administrative process.
In the absence of an agency appeal
or a timely reopening, that amount
is the amount originally set by the
fiscal intermediary.
The Secretary, in contrast, argues
that the statutory language is
ambiguous with regard to the way in
which she may calculate the aver-
age GME per-resident cost.
According to the Secretary, the
"amount recognized as reasonable"
could mean the baseline GME costs
that are recognized as reasonable
through the reauditing process, or it
could refer to costs that were recog-
nized as reasonable at the time of
the original determination.
The ambiguity, says the Secretary,
stems from use of the past participle
"recognized," which does not itself
necessarily express time and may
be used in the passive voice to refer
to the present. Therefore since
Congress did not speak directly to
the point, the Secretary argues that
courts must uphold the interpreta-
tion as long as it is reasonable. See
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Not surprisingly, the Secretary con-
tends that her interpretation is
plainly reasonable. Congress, after
all, had created a new methodology
for determining all future GME
reimbursements, which, rather than
relying on actual costs in future
years, would be strongly influenced
by the GME costs incurred during
the baseline year. Consequently,
says the Secretary, it is altogether
appropriate to put into place an
approach that minimizes the possi-
bility that past errors - errors
made in originally calculating rea-
sonable GME costs for the baseline
year - would distort future reim-
bursements. The Secretary argues,
moreover, that her interpretation is
consistent with both her responsi-
bility to implement the Medicare
program in a prudent manner and
her statutory authority to issue reg-
ulations defining reasonable costs.
The Medical Center, however,
argues that Congress' grant of gener-
al rule-making authority to the
Secretary does not overcome
Congress' clear expression of intent.
Here, says the Center, Congress did
not intend for the Secretary to
ignore the original determination
process and substitute a new one.
The Center insists that if Congress
had intended to upset the settled
way of determining GME reimburse-
ment, it would have said so in the
amendment itself or at least would
have mentioned it in the legislative
history. That history, observes the
Center, is silent on this matter.
Even if the Court finds that the
amendatory language is ambiguous,
the Center argues that the reaudit
rule still fails to satisfy the Chevron
analysis because it is unreasonable.
The rule sets aside final determina-
tions that were completed when
documentation was readily available
and memories were fresh concern-
ing the events of 1984.
The Center adds that the reaudit
rule also conflicts with the
Secretary's own three-year reopen-
ing period which is intended to
ensure accuracy, not impede it. In
short, the Center contends that it
makes no sense to argue that a
reaudit performed in 1991 of 1984
GME costs will be more accurate
than the audit performed in 1986.
The Secretary replies that there was
ample reason to believe at the time
the reaudit rule was promulgated,
and even before, that baseline GME
determinations reflected significant
overpayments. Moreover, GME costs
were not being scrutinized ade-
quately at the time because of a
number of other major changes that
were being implemented in
Medicare. The reaudit in this case,
in fact, proves that the original
determination had been erroneously
and substantially overstated by mis-
classified or nonallowable costs.
The Secretary also denies that the
reaudit rule is unfair because it
undertakes a re-examination of past
GME determinations that are final
under her own regulations. The
reaudit rule, according to the
Secretary, will not displace any
legitimate expectation held by any
hospital with regard to the finality
of reimbursement decisions since
the rule does not extend the three-
year reopening period. Therefore
even though the reaudit rule may
authorize re-examination of an
administratively final determina-
tion, the purpose is not to reopen
that decision and seek recoupment
of any erroneous payments. To the
contrary, the purpose is to establish
an accurate cost basis with respect
to the baseline year to be applied in




Teaching hospitals have a great deal
at stake in this case. If they lose,
Medicare's fiscal intermediaries will
be free to recalculate the GME reim-
bursement baseline. Any recalcula-
tion may well affect adversely all
future GME reimbursements, depen-
dent as they are on the baseline fig-
ure. Perhaps more devastating from
the hospitals' perspective is the fact
that the readjusted baseline figure
may be used to demand repayment
of some considerable sums that
have been paid to the hospitals dur-
ing the last three years subject to
reopening. In this case, the Medical
Center could be required to repay
more than $33,000 per year, per
resident.
Should the Secretary lose, however,
any errors that may have been
made in originally calculating GME
costs during the baseline year of
1984 will be set in stone, never to
be re-examined. Under the lock-step
formula Congress enacted for GME
costs, the Medicare program would
be required to compound those
errors, year after year, by making
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